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ORGANIZATIONAL CONTUMACY IN THE TRANSMISSION OF JUDICIAL POLICIES: THE MAPP, ESCOBEDO,
MIRANDA, AND GAULT CASES
BRADLEY C.

CANONt

UNTIL RECENTLY, scant attention had been given to the reac-

tions of state or lower federal courts to decisions announced by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The justices perhaps assumed
that each decision was meeting with full compliance and many scholars
writing in law journals operated implicitly upon this assumption as
well. At times, of course, we intuitively knew that such was not the
case, but there were few attempts to determine the extent of actual
compliance. Then, about 15 years ago, perhaps in the wake of the
obvious noncompliance with Brown v. Board of Education,' several
scholars began to examine the aftermath of Supreme Court decisions
and developed a literature known as "judicial impact studies." 2 While
the scope of these studies was varied, to a large extent they focused
upon the behavior of those persons ultimately charged with the implementation of controversial High Court decisions in three specific
areas: In addition to the aforementioned desegregation area, there
were book-length studies' and articles4 which charted the reactions
of public school administrators and teachers to the Court's decisions
concerning released time5 and prayer in the public schools,6 as well
t Associate Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky. B.S., Florida State University, 1959, M.S., 1960; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1967. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
Richard L. Engstrom, L. C. Taylor, and Robert Roper in conducting the research
reported here. He also wishes to express appreciation to Professors David Fellman,
Ira Sharkansky and Lawrence Baum for comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript.
Financial support for the research was made possible by a grant from the University
of Kentucky Research Foundation.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

2. The seminal work was Patric, The Impact of a Court Decision: Aftermath
of the McCullom Case, 6 J. PUB. LAw 455 (1957). A good recent survey of this
literature is S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME
PERSPECTIVES (1970) [hereinafter cited as WASBY].
3. The books are: K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISION
(1971) [hereinafter cited as DOLBEARE & HAMMOND]; R. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS
OF COMPLIANCE (1967) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON]; and W. MUIR, PRAYER IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).

4. A list of articles on this subject can be found in WASBY, supra note 2, at 285-86.
5. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333

U.S. 203 (1948). In Zorach, public schools released students during normal school
hours to leave the school grounds to attend religious instruction given by different
religious groups in nearby centers. See JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 49. McCollum
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as behavior of policemen in reaction to such criminal justice decisions
as Miranda v. Arizona.' Much work remains to be done in these
areas, and, of course, such studies should be expanded to cover the
aftermath of other Supreme Court decisions as well. Nonetheless,
these studies have given us our first in-depth insights into how people
"in the field" have complied with controversial decisions of the nation's
highest court.
In one sense, compliance is fairly easy to measure. One simply
looks at the behavior of those charged with implementing a Supreme
Court decision and notes whether or not they are carrying it out. An

element of sophistication can be added by acknowledging the existence
of an amorphous middle ground which renders both observation and
measurement more difficult. Often termed "evasion" or "foot-dragging," such behavior involves surface adherence to the Supreme Court
decision, but subversion of its fundamental goals through a ritualistic
and spiritless conformity accompanied by a continuation of earlier
policies at less visible junctures.
However, analyzing the measure of compliance should involve
more than noting the behavior of persons in the field or even probing
it for manifestations of evasion or foot-dragging. To implement a
policy, people must understand it. In some cases, it is obviously not clear
even to appellate judges exactly what circumstances a given Supreme
Court decision encompasses. Equally important, leaving the matter
of ambiguity aside, a correct interpretation is not always communicated to those charged with implementing a decision. Teachers and
policemen, the prime research examples, are generally not lawyers;

they therefore must depend upon others for an interpretation of what
kinds of behavior a Supreme Court decision commands, permits, or
prohibits. Moreover, such persons are hardly autonomous in their
search for an interpreter, but, instead, usually receive authoritative
interpretations of court decisions from their superiors. Local authorities such as school superintendents and police chiefs are perhaps initially
somewhat more independent, but eventually they, too, are subject to
having an authoritative interpretation imposed upon them - most
often by local judges who, whether in the state system or United
States district courts, are at the lower end of a judicial hierarchy,
two or three tiers removed from the Supreme Court.
involved the release of children from class, upon parents' consent, for religious instruction conducted by clergy upon school property. See WASBY, supra note 2, at 127.
6. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963:); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See N. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (1971); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970). See also WASBY, supra note 2, at 287-88.
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In other words, we cannot necessarily understand the factors
underlying the behavior of those charged with the actual implementation of a Supreme Court decision until we recognize that such persons
are at the bottom of a multi-level chain of authoritative communication and that their behavior is influenced in large part by the interpretations and glosses passed down the chain. A school superintendent, for instance, may permit voluntary prayer in his district
because a local judge has stated that such a practice is legal or has
publicly indicated his disapproval of the Court's decision.' Perhaps
as a result of a local judge's decisions or attitudes, a police department
may add, alter, or delete phrases which have the effect of substantially
changing the Miranda warning given to suspects prior to interrogation.9
The communication of judicial decisions is not greatly different
from the communication of policy decisions in a federal cabinet-level
department or even a large corporation. The analogy is by no means
perfect, but the judiciary shares with more bureaucratic organizations
one central characteristic: a hierarchical authority structure. Subordinates are expected to take their orders and cues from their immediate superiors.'0
In such organizations, vertical communication patterns are crucial
to the actual implementation of policy. Students of bureaucratic behavior have noted that such communications often alter or negate toplevel policies. The policy as implemented is usually at some variance
with that intended. Anthony Downs has argued that "[t]here are
very few orders so precise and unequivocal that they cannot be distorted by a factor of 10 per cent" without danger of serious retribution;
in some situations, he has suggested, the factor may be much greater."
In part, this distortion of policy may not be deliberate and, in fact,
may be unavoidable. Policy decisions are usually phrased in general
terms and do not specify exact behavior in every contingency which
might arise. Subordinates are fully expected to exercise some discretion in making particular decisions. Even conscientious subordinates
may be influenced by their own policy preferences, parochial loyalties
8. DOLBEARE & HAMMOND, supra note 3, at 45-54, noted this phenomenon.
9. See Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519, 1550-54 (1967), where the authors discuss police variations of the warning.
See also Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's
Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968).
10. For greater discussion of this topic, see generally Murphy, Lower Court
Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1017 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Murphy]; Wasby, The Communication of the Supreme Court's Criminal
Procedure Decisions: A PreliminaryMapping, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1086 (1973).
11. A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 135 (1966). Downs has termed this
Published
by Villanova
Universityleakage."
Charles Widger
of Law Digital Repository, 1974
phenomenon
"authority
Id. at School
134-36.
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or political pressures to make interpretations somewhat different from
those the top-level policy makers would make in the same situation.
Often, however, the negation of policy is deliberate. Subordinates
may deemphasize the importance of a particular policy, adopt a strained
interpretation of it, express confusion as to its goals and meaning, or
simply take their time implementing it. Usually, these practices are
accomplished without resort to overt disobedience or defiance; the
appearances of compliance and unity of purpose are maintained. This
is the "foot-dragging" syndrome described above. It is a common
feature of bureaucratic functioning and comes as no surprise to anyone
familiar with large organizations.12
Upon infrequent occasions, however, subordinates will go beyond
"foot-dragging" or other evasive tactics. Such behavior is particularly
likely with sharp and sudden departures from past policy. The facade
of unity is overthrown; a more overt form of resistance is adopted,
one which might be labelled "organizational contumacy." Subordinates publicly denounce or ridicule their superior's policy. They either
categorically refuse to comply with it or do so in a dramatically begruding fashion with no appearance of routineness. In addition, they
attempt to marshal political resources and allies to pressure the organization's leaders for modification or reversal of the offensive policy.13
The functioning of hierarchical organizations is dependent upon
the possession by subordinates of a broad "zone of indifference" 14 to
the substance of organizational policy. This enables them to accept
their superior's policies with equanimity, if not enthusiasm. Presumably, then, organizational contumacy is motivated only by subordinates' very intense feelings - feelings that their own primary functions
or the welfare of those whom they immediately serve are gravely
jeopardized. Its occurrence can often mark a crisis in the organization's development; its resolution, regardless of who prevails, may
well alter the nature of the organization. And obviously, if organizational contumacy becomes a frequent phenomenon, the organization's
viability will be seriously impaired.
12. For examples from various levels of government bureaucracies, see R. FENNO,
CABINET (1959)
[hereinafter cited as FENNO]; H. RODGERS & C.
BULLOCK, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1972) ; Lipset, Bureaucracy and Social Change,
in READER IN BUREAUCRACY 221 (R. Mertin ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Lipset].
13. For examples of such conduct in governmental bureaucracies, see the discussions of the resistance of the Passport Bureau and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to policies formulated by their superiors in L. GAWTHROP, BUREAUCRATIC
BEHAVIOR IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 67-68, 148-49 (1969) and of the behavior of
General Douglas MacArthur and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey in R.
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1960)
[hereinafter cited as NEUSTADT].
14. C. BARNARD, FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 168-69 (1938) [hereinafter
cited as BARNARD].
TIlE PRESIDENT'S
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These reactive behavior patterns can be found in the subordinate
echelons of the judiciary as well as in more conventional bureaucratic
organizations. Indeed, ambiguous communications (court opinions)
and implementations are the woof and warp of appellate judicial
activity. Illustrations of judicial "foot-dragging" are certainly not
difficult to find' 5 and organizational contumacy in the judiciary has
also occurred from time to time. The early history of the Republic
is replete with such examples. Recall the great struggles between John
Marshall and Spencer Roane of the Virginia Court of Appeals and
think how different our judicial system would be today had the latter's
defiance carried the day. a" Indeed, as lower court behavior following
the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education17 attests, strong
echoes of this ancient fight can still reverberate through the judicial
system.' 8
Of course, when comparing the judiciary with a government
bureaucracy, we must keep in mind the imperfect nature of the analogy.
One obvious distinction is that judicial superiors have little control
over the appointment, retention, or promotion of their subordinates.
They are, therefore, notably lacking in their ability to bring to bear
the types of sanctions central to the maintenance of control in conventional bureaucratic hierarchies. A more subtle difference is found
in the Anglo-American legal tradition's condonation, within limits,
of creativity and equity on the part of subordinate judges - especially
appellate judges. Furthermore, the vertical communication pattern in
the judiciary is not strictly bureaucratic; Supreme Court decisions are
not sent directly to subordinates as "orders," but rather are given
general dissemination throughout the legal world.
These differences, although important, are often more apparent
than real. Top-level policy makers in many governmental and political
bureaucracies often do not have a free hand in personnel selection
because of political obligations, the necessity of securing local cooperation, or merit system requirements.'" Even when subordinates serve
at the superior's pleasure, it is often politically infeasible to "fire"
15. See Sanders, The Warren Court and the Lower Federal Courts: Problems
of Implementation in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 423 (J.
Schmidhauser ed. 1963) ; Murphy, supra note 10; Note, Judicial Performance in the
Fifth Circuit, 73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963).

16. The leading cases are Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821),
and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See generally W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 91-122 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as MURPHY]; Stern, Judge William Harold Cox and the Right to
Vote in Clarke County, Mississippi, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 65 (L. Friedman ed. 1965).
19. See generally FENNO, supra note 12; Carey, Presidential Stafling in the
note 12.
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by Villanova
University Charles
Widger
School
of Law
Repository,
and Seventies,
29 PUB.
ADMIN.
REV.
450 Digital
(1969);
Lipset, 1974
supra

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 2
NOVEMBER,

1974]

ORGANIZATIONAL

CONTUMACY

them.2 ° Moreover, for many occupants of posts at the top levels of
the federal government, political parties, and some corporations, such
an action, even if it can be freely accomplished, often lacks a serious
element of threat (deprivation of income or a stymied career)

.21

Even

apart from the availability of effective sanctions, executives frequently
find it convenient to encourage or at least tolerate innovation or
flexibility by their ranking subordinates.2 2 Finally, the simultaneous
communication of policy to all levels of a bureaucratic organization
(much like the distribution of a Supreme Court opinion) is a rather
frequent occurrence.

Moreover, the judiciary possesses some organizational characteristics in greater strength than governmental or political bureaucracies.
Most prominent are high organizational identification, status, and
isolation.23 Judges, of course, are distinctive people in our society.
When appearing in public, they don special garments designed to
identify clearly their role and prestige and are accorded certain verbal
:and physical symbols of deference. Additionally, societal norms drastically restrict direct pressures upon judicial decision-making. These
,characteristics serve to reinforce organizational loyalty in the judiciary.
Judges do not envision themselves as mere executives or bureaucrats
implementing a policy that may or may not appeal to them, but as a
unique type of public official charged with applying an almost metaphysical "law" to those who come before their court.
In short, while judges are perhaps somewhat less subject to direct
control by their hierarchical superiors, they are also much less subject to parochial or political pressures to resist their superiors' policies.
I.
In this article we explore the organizational contumacy evidenced
in state supreme courts' responses, during the years 1961-72, to interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United
States. This is accomplished by analyzing the insertion of "contumacious" messages into the vertical communication channels. State
20. The late J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, of course, is the classic example. For
less salient examples, see NEUSTADT, supra note 13, at 13, 23-24. See also P. BLAU,
BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY 76-77 (1956).
21. See generally BARNARD, supra note 14, at 139-60; S. ELDERSVELD, POLITICAL
PARTIES: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 272-303, 410-33 (1964); S. HUNTINGTON, THE
COMMON DEFENSE

22. See

146-51 (1961).

note 12, at 218-49; A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS
211-41 (1960); A. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS 627-30 (1965).
23. For a discussion of the importance of organizational identification and pressures counteracting it, see J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATION S 67-77 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as MARCH & SIMON]; P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS
250-59 (1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/2
FENNO, supra

OF UPHEAVAL

6

Canon: Organizational Contumacy in the Transmission of Judicial Policies
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

20 : p. 50

supreme courts, of course, interpret United States Supreme Court decisions for trial courts in their respective states.24 It is at this juncture
that they inform their subordinates of their attitudes and plans with
regard to any given Supreme Court decision.
Such a focus is conducive to observing this type of organizational contumacy because both the original policy message and the
state supreme courts' reactions to it are readily available in judicial
opinions. Moreover, a publicly released opinion is the only real
method by which state supreme courts can communicate "orders" or
cues to lower courts. Judicial norms and distance prevent state supreme
courts from developing non-public channels of vertical communication
about particular United States Supreme Court decisions.2"
We shall treat as organizational contumacy only those state
supreme court opinions which contain an explicit, negative evaluation
of a United States Supreme Court decision (outcome), its accompanying opinion, a series of related outcomes or opinions, or the competence and authority of the High Court itself. We shall not apply the
concept to state court opinions which resort to merely questionable or
restrictive interpretations of a Supreme Court decision. An example will
illustrate this distinction: One state supreme court might hand down
a decision stating, "Miranda involved confessions in a police station
while the instant case involves one in a squad car; therefore Miranda
is not applicable here." Another state supreme court might write,
"Miranda is an illogical and pernicious decision which will increase
crime and diminish public safety; therefore we intend to interpret it
extremely narrowly." While both courts may be quite offended by
Miranda, only the latter is unequivocal in its evaluation of the decision
and its plans regarding future applications of the doctrine.
More importantly, the latter court is publicly disputing the competence and authority of its hierarchical superior while the former is
responding in the well-understood "foot-dragging" syndrome previously described. Presumably, organizational contumacy in vertical
communications is more likely to defeat disagreeable policy than is
24. Opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States are public and available
to trial and appellate judges alike. Consequently, a state supreme court cannot literally
distort the policy message. Its assessment of the decision, however, can serve the
same function. As in the feudal vassal-lord relationship, a lower state court is most
likely to follow the lead of its state supreme court even when the latter's stance is
seemingly at odds with that of the United States Supreme Court. See statements to
this effect in Collins v. State, 197 So. 2d 574, 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (dissenting opinion) ; In re Benn, 18 Ohio App. 2d 97, 247 N.E.2d 335 (1969).
25. Judicial conferences and private social contact may provide ad hoc exceptions,
but they are not sources of consistent vertical communication.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
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"foot-dragging," at least in the short run.2 6 Nevertheless, it can be
cogently argued that failure to adhere to bureaucratic norms will have
a more inimical effect on the authority and status of the judiciary. As
Walter Murphy has noted, judges who publicly defy their superiors
must realize that they are inviting similar treatment from those
beneath them in the judicial hierarchy." The cohesion of all judicial
systems is weakened by such outright expressions of temerity. Moreover, such behavior affects the legitimacy of judicial authority. Public
acceptance of the judiciary's special competence to determine the
law may suffice to win reluctant compliance with unpopular judicial
policies.2" However, when such competence is publicly disputed by
judges themselves, laymen can be expected to pick up cues and behave accordingly.
It should be emphasized that organizational contumacy in the
judiciary is not always equivalent to uncategorical defiance. State
supreme courts in the final analysis will usually apply, albeit perhaps
grudgingly and very narrowly, the decision they castigate. Nor is
verbalized organizational contumacy always accompanied by efforts
to modify or overturn Supreme Court policies, although this sometimes
occurs. Yet it is a form of public pressure upon the Court and may
well affect field compliance with its policies. Moreover, it is an indicator, if not a catalyst, of potential crisis for the judicial bureaucracy
in the formulation and implementation of constitutional law.

The post-1961 era was ripe for such a crisis. Through its promulgation of desegregation policies in the previous decade,2 9 the
Supreme Court had aroused bitter animosity in the South. In the
1960's, the reapportionment" and school prayer decisions 1 won the
Court new enemies, and a series of decisions spectacularly enhancing
26. DOLBEARE & HAMMOND, supra note 3, found that in the states where educational agencies expressed open opposition to the school prayer decisions, School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 20 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), there was
considerably less compliance than in those states where agencies gave at least routine
verbal support to the decisions. DOLBEARE & HAMMOND, supra note 3, at 34-35.
27. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 1022.
28. Public acceptance of judicial omniscience is analyzed most cogently in 3.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
While there is evidence that public
acceptance is not as pervasive today, many retain this traditional reverence. See, e.g.,
Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 2 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 357 (1968).
29. The seminal case was, of course, Brown v. Board of Edu., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). Other opinions included: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903, aff'g mem. 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); Holmes v.
City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (mem.) ; Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877, aff'g men. 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
30. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) ; Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
31. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/2
421 (1962).
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the rights of defendants in criminal proceedings 2 further alienated it
from public support. It was the most activist Court in at least three
decades. More importantly, it was the activism of change, not resistance; the Supreme Court became the cutting edge of legal innovation
in American society. Not surprisingly, this zeal for change was not
shared by most state supreme courts. More rural and parochial in
their backgrounds, careers, and environments, 3 3 the justices of these
courts were not prone to overthrow precedent and the status quo, and
were even less inclined to sacrifice their own autonomy.
In fact, a dramatic example of organizational contumacy had
already taken place. In 1958, the Conference of State Chief Justices
had passed by an overwhelming margin a resolution criticizing the
Supreme Court's lack of "judicial self-restraint" and its concomitant
"invasion of the field of legislation. 3' 4 No similar unified protest of
subordinate judges had occurred in the history of the American
judiciary. Moreover, as the Court persisted in expanding the fourteenth amendment's applicability to the states, in 1964 the Council of
State Governments (which houses the Conference of State Chief
Justices) sponsored a constitutional amendment which would have
established a "Court of the Union" composed of the 50 state chief
justices.3 5 This court would have superseded the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter of constitutional disputes involving issues of federalism.3 6 The Council's effort did not succeed, however, and again the
High Court ignored its subordinates' remonstrances.
This article focuses upon the organizational contumacy provoked
by three criminal justice policies established by the Supreme Court
in the 1960's. The first was Mapp v. Ohio37 which held that evidence
obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures was inadmissible
in state criminal trials. The second policy was initially developed in
5
Escobedo v. Illinois"
and further expanded and clarified in Miranda

v. Arizona. 9 In these decisions, the Court ruled not only that an
32. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. Canon, Characteristicsand Career Patterns of State Supreme Court Justices,

45

GoV'T 34 (1972).
34. N.Y. Times, August 24, 1958, at 1, col. 5. Unified subordinate action is probably a more potent form of organizational contumacy than the separate criticisms
upon which this article focuses. In the judiciary such unity is difficult to achieve
STATE

because the subordinates, separated by great distances, engage in little interaction.

The 1958 resolution is all the more dramatic for this reason.
35. Id., April 14, 1963, at 1, col. 6.

36. Id.
37. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
38. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Published by39.
Villanova
University
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
384 U.S.
436 (1966).
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accused, while in police custody, must be provided with an opportunity to consult with counsel, but also that incriminating statements
made by the accused during police interrogation were inadmissible at
trial unless he had been informed that he had the right to remain
silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, and
that he was entitled to have a lawyer (including an appointed one if
the accused were indigent) present during questioning." The third
policy was announced in In re Gault,4 1 where the Court held that defendants in juvenile court proceedings in which the institutional commitment of the juvenile might result were entitled to adequate notice of
specific charges, the presence of counsel (including an appointed one if
the child was indigent) at trial, the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
A survey of state supreme court decisions through 1972 disclosed
approximately 1800 decisions in which the aforementioned cases were
discussed in some detail.42 In most instances the state supreme court
applied or distinguished the Supreme Court decisions without inserting
into its opinion any evaluation of the decision's merits or consequences.
However, in 91 opinions the state supreme court negatively evaluated
one or more of the decisions.43 It is these instances of organizational
contumacy which are to be analyzed here.4 4
The Mapp, Escobedo-Miranda, and Gault decisions are highly
useful vehicles for exploring the nature of organizational contumacy
upon the part of state supreme courts for several reasons. First, the
cases represented highly dramatic shifts in Supreme Court policy.
Unlike most Supreme Court decisions, which more or less honor the
doctrine of stare decisis and tend to shift policy in slow, incremental
steps, these decisions swept away longstanding policies steeped in doctrine and precedent, and erected almost revolutionary legal policies in
their place. Moreover, the Court was quite explicit in leaving no doubt
40. But cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), wherein the Court ruled
that such in-custody statements by the defendant could be used to impeach his credibility if he took the witness stand.

41. 387 U.S.1 (1967).
42. A Shepardization process was used to locate these decisions. In myriad other
decisions, Mapp, Escobedo-Miranda, or Gault, were'merely cited in passing.
43. The cutoff date for researching cases was December 31, 1972. Only cases
in a state's highest appellate court (labeled generically as state supreme courts in this
paper regardless of their actual title) are included here. Cursory reading of some
state intermediate appellate court opinions indicates the presence of organizational
contumacy at that level as well.
44. Two recent works which discuss the manner in which the various state
supreme courts applied Mapp, Escobedo, and Miranda to a number of unresolved
questions are: Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court
Civil Liberties Decision, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 109 (1973); Romans, The Role of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/2
State Supreme Courts in Judicial Policy Making: Escodebo, Miranda and the Use of
Judicial Imipact Analysis, 27 WESTERN POL. Q. 38 (1974).
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that the old precedents were being discarded and in establishing the
basic outlines, if not the detailed applications, of the new order of things.
Second, by expanding criminal defendants' rights so broadly, these
decisions provoked widespread criticism from politicians generally and
law enforcement personnel particularly. As the crime rate rose, so did
an accompanying demand for "law and order," and the Supreme Court
found itself upon the defensive, particularly following the EscobedoMiranda decisions. In the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon
frequently and pointedly pledged to restore the balance between the
"peace forces" and the "criminal forces, '"" while George Wallace's
vehement denunciations of the High Court's decisions became the most
salient feature of his campaign. In short, the policies announced in
these four decisions were highly controversial and the usual pressures
for conformity stemming from hierarchical deference were countered by
widespread political pressure for some kind of relief, symbolic or real.
Finally, the legitimacy of the policies established in these cases
was open to challenge upon at least two grounds. First, in the procedural sense, these decisions marked the entrance of the Supreme
Court into areas which for virtually a century it had held to be the
constitutional prerogative of the state courts: since 1884, the Court
had repeatedly asserted that while the fourteenth amendment's "due
process" clause protected citizens from gross violations of procedural
fairness, it did not require states to abide by particular procedures
found in the Bill of Rights, federal precedents, or elsewhere." However, in 1961, beginning with Mapp, the Court virtually abandoned
this federalistic position. By the decade's end, most of these Bill of
Rights provisions had been "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment's "due process" clause;4 moreover, the provisions had been
45. Candidate Nixon specifically denounced Escobedo and Miranda. See N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1968, at 32, col. 7.
46. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (prosecutor in state

criminal proceeding may comment upon defendant's failure to testify in his own
behalf); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (fifth amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy not applicable to state criminal prosecutions); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
not applicable to state criminal prosecutions); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516

(1884)

(informations may take place of grand jury indictments in state criminal

proceedings).
47. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)

(double jeopardy prohibi-

tion of fifth amendment enforceable against states) ;Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (right to jury trial in all criminal cases which, if tried in federal court, would
come within sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury) ; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right of defendant in state criminal proceeding to speedy
trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)

(fifth amendment's application to

state criminal proceedings forbids either comment by prosecution on accused's silence
orbyinstructions
by courtCharles
that such
silence
is ofevidence
of guilt)
; Pointer
Published
Villanova University
Widger
School
Law Digital
Repository,
1974 v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
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broadly interpreted, with the Escobedo-Miranda decisions the -most
conspicuous examples. That the legitimacy of such decisions might
be questioned is understandable. How could the unchanged Constitution -

the judicial hierarchy's basic organizational document -

which

had distributed authority in one manner for more than eight decades
now suddenly provide for a different distribution of authority?
There was another basis upon which the legitimacy of the
Supreme Court's policies (at least in Mapp and Escobedo-Miranda)
could be questioned. These decisions prescribed and proscribed particular police behavior. Most previous defendants' rights decisions
had focused upon such rights in a judicial setting - at the trial or in
the pre-trial proceedings.4" The argument was made that while supervising court procedures was within the Court's bailiwick, dictating
police behavior was not. Considerations of legality aside, many viewed
the Court's actions as being totally unwarranted by tradition and
inimical to the judicial function.4"
Obviously, the Supreme Court's decisions in Mapp, EscobedoMiranda, and Gault were atypical in their departure from precedent
and their generation of controversy. Yet it is, almost axiomatic that
organizational contumacy will only occur in response to atypical policies,
if it is to occur at all. Knowledge of the reactions of subordinate
judges under such stress can give us some insight into the judiciary's
strength as a constitutional policy-making organization.
II.
The most frequent examples of organizational contumacy among
state supreme courts were decisions deploring the adverse impact of
the Supreme Court's decisions upon public safety. Those taking this
approach seemed to identify less with the values ascribed to courts
in determining constitutional policy than with values held by those
outside the judiciary. They denigrated the judicial traditions of
isolated detachment and concern for proper procedures; on the contrary, there was an almost open identification with law enforcement
agencies and their values. "Government is constituted to provide law
and order. The Bill of Rights must be understood in the light of that
mission," the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced."0 In other
nesses made obligatory on states) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to state criminal proceedings).
48. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
49. This theme is discussed at length in F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED
WOUND (1970).
50. State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 52, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/2

12

Canon: Organizational Contumacy in the Transmission of Judicial Policies
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 20 : p. 50

cases, the same court argued that the judiciary needed more "realism"'"
and admonished it to attune itself to "the tumult of the streets, [not]
abstract contemplation." 52 Sometimes organizational contumacy appeared to reflect the political pressures surrounding the judiciary.
Reminiscent of former Vice President Spiro Agnew's or Governor
George Wallace's rhetoric, some courts publicly eschewed "the effete
attitude''5 3 or "the soft approach" to criminal justice.5 4
In particular, state supreme courts evinced considerable sympathy
for the police. At best, the Supreme Court's rulings were charged
with being too complex or confusing to warrant instant or complete
police compliance. As the Indiana court stated, officers could not be
expected to "conduct a course in constitutional law" every time they
had to make a decision.55 At worst, the decisions did not make good
sense to the police.56 Judicial rebuke by reversal of convictions was
viewed as an unwise policy which would further alienate law enforcement personnel from the courts.5 7 According to the Washington
Supreme Court, "The constant arching of the judicial eyebrows at the
police and routine investigations conducted by them does little to advance the cause of civil liberty and much to endanger the public safety."5 "
Underlying this concern was a belief that the Supreme Court's
decisions seriously limited the ability of law enforcement agencies to
solve crimes, that they "handcuffed and shackled" the police.59 In the
opinion of some courts, large numbers of criminals were escaping
justice. Utah's high court believed that the Supreme Court had so
"exaggerated" the defendants' rights "as to give licentious protections
to criminal conduct,"6 " while the New Jersey court asserted that "[I]t
is idle to suppose, as some do, that those decisions have no impact upon
law enforcement or at the worst only a minimal one."61
51. State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 589, 279 A.2d 675, 676 (1971).
52. State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 264, 250 A.2d 130, 131 (1969).
53. State v. Collins, 253 La. 149, 165, 217 So. 2d 182, 188 (1968) (dissenting
opinion).
54. Neuenfeldt v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 20, 26, 138 N.W.2d 252, 256 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1025 (1966).
55. Johnson v. State, 256 Ind. 497, 502, 269 N.E.2d 879, 881 (1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 921 (1972). See also State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P.2d 240 (1963),
vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 1 (1964).
56. Goad v. State, 239 Md. 345, 349, 211 A.2d 337, 340 (1964).
57. See, e.g., People v. Grossman, 20 N.Y.2d 346, 229 N.E.2d 589, 283 N.Y.S.2d
12 (1967); Commonwealth v. Eperjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 224 A.2d 216 (1966).
58. State v. Bower, 73 Wash. 2d 634, 644, 440 P.2d 167, 173 (1968).
59. State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 446, 456 S.W.2d 840, 844 (1970). See also
State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 231 A.2d 353 (1967).
60. State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 305, 307, 480 P.2d 736, 737 (1971).
61. State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 263, 250 A.2d 130, 131 (1969). Some dissenters were even more forceful in their accusations. See State v. Bitz, 89 Idaho 181,
404 P.2d 628 (1965) (Taylor, J., dissenting in part); State v. Barger, 242 Md. 616,
A.2d 304University
(1966) Charles
(Barnes,
J., dissenting).
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Victims of crime were also an object of judicial concern; one court
called them "forgotten people." 2 "The law abiding citizen should not
be forgotten," echoed another.63 This concern extended to future victims: the Georgia court prayed that the Supreme Court's concern for
individual rights not overrule "the superior rights of the public to be
protected against rapists, robbers, kidnappers and murderers."6 4 And
the New Jersey court warned, "To set criminals free is to exact a price,
not from some pain-free societal entity, but from innocent individuals
who will be their next victims." 65
For some courts, the lack of full identification with the judiciary's
own organizational values caused them to "distort" considerably the
communications of the Supreme Court. Some of their opinions conjured up the spectre of an almost Hobbesian world as the logical
progeny of decisions such as Escobedo or Miranda. Mississippi's
highest court prophesied that soon "nothing will remain for the citizen,
save to convert his home into a fortress, and go armed for his own and
his family's protection."" 6 Others noted the rising crime rate or resorted to painting emotion-arousing portraits of murderers going unpunished or rapists roaming the streets at will.6" Not all were as dramatic in their description and downward communication of the Supreme
Court's opinions, but some spoke fearfully of such things as the danger
to the social fabric stemming from the High Court's decisions.6"
For some state supreme courts, organizational contumacy arose
not so much from an identification with groups outside the judiciary
as from an identification with the lower echelons of the judicial organization. The gravamen of their resistance was not the adverse substantive impact of the Supreme Court's policies, but the adverse
organizational impact. These courts were reacting to the seeming
uncertainty and instability into which the four High Court decisions
had placed a good part of the law of criminal procedure. Uncertainty
about organizational policy is a major source of intraorganizational
62. Gasque v. State, 271 N.C. 323, 334, 156 S.E.2d 740, 747 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1030 (1968). See also People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329, 303
N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969).
63. State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 446, 456 S.W.2d 840, 844 (1970).
64. Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190, 204, 144 S.E.2d 103, 113 (1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 385 U.S. 538 (1966).
65. State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 264, 250 A.2d 130, 131 (1969).
66. Davis v. State, 204 So. 2d 270, 276-77 (Miss. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
394 U.S. 721 (1969).
67. See, e.g., Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190, 204, 144 S.E.2d 103, 113 (1965), rev'd
on other grounds, 385 U.S. 538 (1966) ; State v. Caha, 184 Neb. 70, 76, 165 N.W.2d
362, 365 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 939 (1970); Gasque v. State, 271 N.C. 323,
334, 156 S.E.2d 740, 748 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1030 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/2
68. See, e.g., State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 263-64, 250 A.2d 130, 131 (1969).
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tension.69 As with the higher echelons in all hierarchical organizations,
a primary function of appellate courts is the maintenance of stability
and predictability in policy output. Indeed, some appellate judges
accord this function greater weight than that assigned to the quality
of the law.7" Changes in the law occur, of course, but ideally they
should come slowly and incrementally. Because Mapp, EscobedoMiranda, and Gault constituted significant and sudden shifts in the
law, some state supreme courts became visibly upset. They worried
about the rapidity with which "far-reaching and revolutionary"'"
changes were enervating the criminal justice system and sought an
opportunity for the "proper digestion by society of the radical departures" from past law. 2 To other courts the considerable ambiguity
which always accompanies great changes was most bothersome; some
openly complained of having to engage in "second guessing future
Supreme Court decisions, '"" or confessed to "wishing we had a
'
crystal ball." 74
Another cause of uncertainty was the clouded future of the
Warren Court's criminal justice decisions - particularly the exclusionary rule and the interrogation doctrines.75 Several state courts
noted that Mapp, Escobedo, and Miranda had been rendered by close
votes. While none explicitly argued that a 5-4 decision was less au69. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 23, at 113-19.
70. "For it is better that laws of doubtful soundness be certain than that all law
stand in imminent danger of being declared void because it is not written as some
Justices would prefer." Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190, 204, 144 S.E.2d 103, 113 (1965),
rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 538 (1966). See also Chief Justice William Howard
Taft's views on this point reported in MURPHY, supra note 18, at 61.
71. Brumley v. Charles R. Denney Juvenile Center, 77 Wash. 2d 702, 706, 466
P.2d 481, 483 (1970). See also Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 254 N.E.2d 319 (1970).
72. State v. Cummings, 49 Hawaii 522, 531, 423 P.2d 438, 444 (1967). Dissenters
sometimes elaborated this point bitterly. See Gross v. State, 235 Md. 429, 201 A.2d
808 (1964) (Hammond, J., dissenting). At least one court saw constitutional law
in static, unchanging terms. See Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266
(1968), where the court lamented the application of federal criminal procedure to
state courts.
73. Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
74. Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Ky. 1968). On the other
hand, New York's highest court, in a strange twist of this theme, penalized lawyers
(and their clients) who relied upon the status quo when it refused to apply Mapp
retroactively to cases where no pre-trial objection to illegally seized evidence had
been filed. Such an objection would have been futile at the time, of course, but the
court argued that lawyers know the law is constantly changing and should have
objected anyway. See People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 182 N.E.2d 100, 227 N.Y.S.2d
423 (1962).
75. The Escobedo and Miranda precedents were sharply limited in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See note 40 supra. Chief Justice Burger attacked
the exclusionary rule at length in his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices
Harlan, Black, and Blackmun also expressed dissatisfaction with the exclusionary
rule in their opinions in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490, 493, 510
(1971)
(Harlan,
J., concurring;
BlackSchool
& Blackmun,
JJ., Repository,
concurring1974
and dissenting).
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thoritative than a unanimous one, a few suggested that when cases
were subject to severe political and professional criticism, they might
not have a long legal life. Others expressed the hope that changes in
Court personnel and viewpoint would limit their expansion or sap
their vitality.7" Particularly after the advent of the Nixon administration and its appointment of several justices, some state high courts
began to look openly for an overruling of Miranda and Mapp."
Sometimes the vertical communications of state supreme courts
transmitted organizational contumacy in direct messages to their hierarchical subordinates. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointedly
admonished trial judges not to "jump on their . . .horses and ride

[off] in all directions" in response to Escobedo.78 Several state courts
announced that these Supreme Court decisions should be applied "in
'79
the interest of realistic administration of criminal investigations,
so as to avoid a "devastating impact on the administration of criminal
law,"8 " "disastrous social consequences,"'" or "extraction of a price
from society grossly exorbitant . . . compared to the value likely to

be received."8 2 Logical constructions or extensions were to be rejected if they produced unwise or impractical results. To this end,
several state supreme courts proudly refused to "be presumptuous," 3
"lead the way, ' 84 or "attempt to outrun the Supreme Court of the
United States."8 5
Moreover, messages designed to keep the judicial bureaucracy as
stable as possible were sent to the lower rungs of the organizational
hierarchy.8 " Several courts admonished defense lawyers against relying on a particular Supreme Court decision too often and warned that
76. See, e.g., State v. Sims, 221 Ga. 190, 203-04, 144 S.E.2d 103, 113 (1965),
rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
77. Commonwealth v. Haefeli, - ....
Mass -----, ......
279 N.E.2d 915, 919-20 (1972)

Brunson v. State, 264 So. 2d 817, 820 (Miss. 1972).
78. Commonwealth v. Eperjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 468, 224 A.2d 216, 222 (1966).
79. Wright v. State, 279 Ala. 543, 548, 188 So. 2d 272, 277 (1966). See also
In re D, 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970), appeal dismissed,
403 U.S. 926 (1971).
80. Cradle v.Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874, 879 (1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 945 (1968).
81. In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 650, 463 P.2d 734, 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388,
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).

82. State v.Stone, 294 A.2d 683, 697 (Me.1972).
83. State v. Nelson, 105 N.H. 184, 190, 196 A.2d 52, 57 (1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 1001 (1964).
84. State v. Moore, 189 Neb. 354, 365, 202 N.W.2d 740, 746 (1972).
85. People v. Blessing, 378 Mich. 51, 69, 142 N.W.2d 709, 719 (1966) (Black, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 914 (1967).
86. Of course the number of levels within an organization depends upon one's
definition or perspective. From a narrow point of view, the judicial organization ends
with the trial courts. Viewed more broadly, however, it can include such clientele
groups as administrative agencies, police departments, and lawyers. See generally
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/2
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language of our Highest Court to its fullest meaning"

might endanger the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system.8 7
Where such explicit warnings seemed inappropriate, sarcasm was
employed. A Texas appellate court, for example, referred to the criminal defense bar as having "greeted the Miranda decision with such
exclamations as 'Isn't it wonderful.' ,,s
Organizational contumacy also took the form of disputing the
Supreme Court's reasoning in one or more of its decisions. Here the
subordinate court's behavior did not reflect a loss of loyalty to the
judiciary's values and procedures. Organizational identification was
present in the abstract, but the organization's highest policy makers
were viewed as incompetent. Even so, it must be recognized that public
pronouncements to this effect represent a potential threat to hierarchical
authority as serious as that resulting from organizational alienation.
A number of state supreme courts found the Supreme Court's
factual premises to be in error. For example, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey argued that the absence of the exclusionary rule would not
lead to unbridled police discretion because "[i]t would be a bit absurd
to say ours was a 'police state' before . . . [Mapp]. 89 By the 1970's
some courts were questioning whether the exclusionary rule did in
fact curtail illegal police searches." ° With regard to Miranda, some
argued that the High Court was misinformed about the tactics and
behavior of police in interrogation situations." Furthermore, in the
view of the New York Court of Appeals, the circumstances in Gault
were atypical and unusually dramatic, and it was quite unfortunate
that the Supreme Court had based sweeping conclusions about the
2
nature of the juvenile system upon the facts of that one case.9
87. State v. Taylor, 2 Ariz. App. 314, 320, 408 P.2d 418, 424 (1965), aff'd, 3
Ariz. App. 157, 412 P.2d 726 (1966). See also W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196,
197-202, 247 N.E.2d 253, 255-57, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416-19 (1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In a reverse twist to this theme, a dissenting justice
of the Louisiana Supreme Court cautioned trial judges and district attorneys against
relying upon his court's interpretation of Mapp and other U.S. Supreme Court search
and seizure cases. He referred them instead to the interpretations of local federal
district courts and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See
State ex rel. LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La. 315, 340, 259 So. 2d 557, 566 (1972)
(Barham, J., dissenting).
88. Charles v. State, 424 S.W.2d 909, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 940 (1968). Cf. Hood v. Commonwealth, 448 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Ky. 1969).
89. State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 264, 250 A.2d 130, 131 (1969).
90. State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 589, 279 A.2d 675, 677 (1971); State v.
Valentine, 504 P.2d 84, 87 (Ore. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 948 (1973); State v.
Baker, 78 Wash. 2d 327, 332, 474 P.2d 254, 258 (1970). See also State v. Stone, 294
A.2d 683 (Me. 1972). At least one state supreme court defended the purpose of the
exclusionary rule. See State v. Dias, 52 Hawaii 100, 103, 470 P.2d 510, 512 (1970).
91. See, e.g., State v. Jiminez, 22 Utah 2d 233, 236, 451 P.2d 583, 585 (1969).
92. W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 200-01, 247 N.E.2d 253, 256, 299 N.Y.S.2d
414, 418 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also DeBacker v.
PublishedBrainard,
by Villanova
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of Law Digital Repository, 1974
183 University
Neb. 461, Charles
161 N.W.2d
(1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
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Criticism was also directed at the Supreme Court's heavy emphasis upon the adversary system. It was argued that this system was
a means to an end, not an end in itself. The ultimate goal was justice
and "[i]t was consonant with good morals, and the Constitution, to
' 93
exploit a criminal's ignorance or stupidity in the detectional process.
As Nebraska's highest court stated, "an anticipatory and enthusiastic
expansion of the Miranda holding" would defeat "an honest endeavor
to find out if the accused is guilty or innocent." 4 In stronger language,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland charged the Supreme Court with
having turned the criminal trial into "a sporting event, to be governed
by the Marquis of Queensbury Rules, [rather than] a practical and
actual determination ... of guilt . ...""
A few courts disagreed with'the Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Constitution. To them the fourth amendment was never meant
to apply to rules of evidence and the fifth amendment was never intended to cover interrogation by law enforcement officers.96 Such
requirements were thought to be products of an ideological judicial
activism. In the analogy of Michigan's highest court, Supreme Court
justices went "to even further reaches [than the astronauts] to put
under foot precedents making constitutional interpretations."97
Most of the challenges to the Supreme Court's reasoning were
cogently developed and not openly disrespectful." Sometimes, however,
state supreme courts would indulge in sarcasm - one caustically announced that the Supreme Court had not yet gone so far as to require
a policeman to gag a suspect to keep him from confessing 9 - or unelaborated pejoratives, such as musings that the reasoning in Escobedo
involved "a kind of judicial legerdemain."' 0
Another alternative available to a hierarchical subordinate who
dislikes his superior's policy is to question its legitimacy per se. This
can be accomplished by asserting or implying that the policy is beyond
93.
94.
95.
96.
denied,

State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 53, 243 A.2d 240, 250-51 (1968).
State v. Ross, 186 Neb. 280, 289, 183 N.W.2d 229, 233 (1971).
Goad v. State, 239 Md. 345, 348-49, 211 A.2d 337, 339 (1965).
See, e.g., Meyer v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Ky. 1971), cert.
406 U.S. 919 (1972); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 52, 243 A.2d 240,

250 (1968).
97. People v. Pennington, 383 Mich. 611, 619, 178 N.W.2d 471, 475 (1970).
A resigned tone permeated the Michigan Supreme Court's protest against the justices'
activism. "It avails little to postpone decision in this Court .... It is not hard to
read the handwriting on the wall ...." Id. at 619-20, 178 N.W.2d at 475.
98. Dissenters were less likely to be as respectful. One charged that Mapp's logic
"should appeal only to criminally oriented minds." State v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24,
29, 439 P.2d 844, 847 (1968) (Ellett, J., dissenting).
99. People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 145, 250 N.E.2d 329, 332, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41,

46 (1969).

100. Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied,

U.S. 1023.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/2
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the superior's legal or traditional authority within the organization.
Even more so than questioning a superior's competence, challenging his authority poses a fundamental threat to the organization's
hierarchical structure. Appellate judges fully expect that trial judges
will accord legitimacy to their rulings, and, consequently, they are
aware of the dangerous precedent which is established by undermining
the legitimacy of the decisions of their own superiors. 10 ' For this
reason, this alternative was resorted to rather infrequently.
Echoes of such sentiments could be heard in the Deep South, his.torically the center of states' rights advocacy. Opinions in several states
bemoaned the High Court's lack of comity for state courts and protested against federal court "onslaughts,"' 0 2 "manipulations of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' 0 3 and decisions which "have no basis in
law."' 4 However, their tone was one of resignation; the impassioned
arguments and defiance so characteristic of that region's political
rhetoric were absent.
It was a court far outside the South - in Utah - which issued
the most straightforward challenge to the legitimacy of the Supreme
Court's decisions. In a case governed by Miranda, the Utah Supreme
Court stated flatly that the Court had misconstrued the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision and then fired off a more general
indictment:
The United States Supreme Court, as at present constituted,
has departed from the Constitution as it has been interpreted from
its inception and has followed the urgings of social reformers in
foisting upon this Nation laws which even Congress could not
constitutionally pass. It has amended the Constitution in a manner
unknown to the document itself.' 0 5
101. See Murphy, supra note 10. But see the dissent of Justice Barham in State
ex rel. LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La. 315, 259 So. 2d 557 (1972):
We, sitting as the Supreme Court of Louisiana, attack with harsh and condemning
language our state appellate courts below us for daring to deviate from, or even
to question, our jurisprudence .... Yet we, who under our oath must obey the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution and respond to the United
States Supreme Court decisions, tell that court of final supremacy that we will act
on federal issues as we see fit-its pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. at 339-40, 259 So. 2d at 566 (citations omitted).
102. Boulden v. State, 278 Ala. 437, 451, 179 So. 2d 20, 34 (1965).
103. Wright v. State, 236 So. 2d 408, 410 (Miss. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401

U.S. 929 (1971).
104. Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190, 203, 144 S.E.2d 103, 113 (1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 385 U.S. 538 (1966).
105. Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 405, 439 P.2d 266, 267 (1968). See also
DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 28 (1969), for a similar but more cautious opinion. The Utah court also argued
upon the basis of a detailed historical analysis that the fourteenth amendment had been
adopted in a blatantly unconstitutional manner and that, even if this argument were
disregarded, the amendment was adopted for very limited purposes. Similar argu-
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While the opinion fell one step short of a clarion call to revolt in that
the court reluctantly conceded its obligation to comply, it was certainly
one of the most dangerously contumacious opinions to emanate from the
state supreme courts in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's
criminal justice decisions of the 1960's.
III.
Infrequently, state supreme courts would positively evaluate Mapp,
Escobedo-Miranda, or Gault. There were perhaps two dozen such
occurrences, or about one-fourth the number of negative evaluations.
A few of these opinions demonstrated *a genuine enthusiasm for the
Court's new policies.'
This was particularly true on the Mapp decision, where the Supreme Court's reasoning had previously been
adopted by almost half the state supreme courts. l ' More often, however, the positive evaluation seemed to come from a sense of hierarchical duty. Its most common impetus was a critical dissenting
opinion which would often cause the majority to adopt a defensive
posture while attempting to rationalize its position. Even when a
direct stimulus was not present, positive evaluatory opinions seemed
to be shaped by anticipated criticism from the bar or the public.
Occasionally a state court would articulate its sense of hierarchical
duty and broadly endorse a seemingly unpopular High Court decision.'
Equally often, however, the notion of hierarchical duty was employed to dramatize the state court's disagreement with the Supreme
Court in such prefatory statements as: "Because of Miranda [or
Mapp], we are compelled to . . . .""
The most frequent appeal to
hierarchical duty, however, came from dissenting justices who believed that the majority's decision "ignored"" 0 or "rejected""' its
ments were made in State v. Barger, 242 Md. 616, 220 A.2d 304 (1966) (Barnes, J.,
dissenting) ; and State v. Johns, 185 Neb. 590, 177 N.W.2d 580 (1970) (White, C.J.,
Carter & Newton, JJ., dissenting).
106. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
107. For a list of the states adopting the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp, see the
appendix to Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960).
108. See, e.g., State v. Zachmeier, 151 Mont. 256, 441 P.2d 737 (1968) ; State v.
Carroll, 282 N.C. 326, 334, 193 S.E.2d 85, 90 (1972) ; Lindsey v. State, 448 P.2d 935,
938 (Okla. Crim. 1971); State v. Harp, 457 P.2d 800, 801 (Okla. Crim. 1969).
109. See, e.g., Brunson v. State, 264 So. 2d 817, 820 (Miss. 1972); Hawley v.
Commonwealth, 206 Va. 479, 144 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
910 (1966).
110. State v. Zamora, 93 Idaho 625, 635, 469 P.2d 752, 762 (1970) (McQuade,
J., dissenting).
111. State v. Miller, 259 Iowa 188, 208, 142 N.W.2d 394, 406 (1966) (Becker,
J., dissenting).
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or the "abundantly plain '"11 3 intention of the

Supreme Court. In most such cases, it appeared that the dissenters not
only believed in hierarchical duty, but positively approved the Supreme
Court policy which their colleagues presumably were not applying.
IV.
What has been termed "organizational contumacy" occurred in
nearly two-thirds (32) of the 50 state supreme courts during the
1961-72 period. The phenomenon was found in all the populous, industrial states; many of the states which had no such occurrences are
sparsely populated and had very few cases involving the four Supreme
Court decisions." 4 Otherwise, there were no pronounced regional
proclivities for negatively evaluating the Supreme Court and its criminal
justice decisions (although the courts in Western states did seem to
demonstrate a greater inclination toward positive evaluation).
The frequency and depth of organizational contumacy varied. In
a few states, it amounted to nothing more than one or two short
deprecating sentences during the entire period. In a substantial
number of others, subtle innuendos or brief denunciations were more
regular. In Alabama, for instance, such statements occurred about a
half-dozen times, often with the court pursuing a states' rights theme." 5
Some of these courts reacted to only one decision but made their displeasure known several times. For example, Louisiana,"' Mississippi,"

7

and Wisconsin1 8 aimed barbs at the interrogation decisions,

112. State v. Long, 85 S.D. 431, 442, 185 N.W.2d 472, 478 (1971) (Rentto, P.J.,
dissenting).
113. State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 63, 249 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1969) (Duncan,
J., dissenting). See also Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874, 884 (1967)
(Eggleston, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 954 (1968).
114. For instance, there were only a half-dozen or fewer state supreme court cases
applying Mapp, Escobedo, Miranda, or Gault in North Dakota, West Virginia and
Wyoming.
115. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 282 Ala. 268, 210 So. 2d 826 (1968); Wright v.
State, 279 Ala. 543, 188 So. 2d 272 (1966) ; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453, 179 So. 2d
35 (1965) ; Boulden v. State, 278 Ala. 437, 179 So. 2d 20 (1965) ; Hutto v. State, 278
Ala. 416, 178 So. 2d 810 (1965).
116. State v. Angelo, 251 La. 250, 203 So. 2d 710 (1967) ; State v. Ragsdale, 249
La. 420, 187 So. 2d 427 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967) ; State v. Carter,
248 La. 730, 181 So. 2d 763 (1965).
117. Brunson v. State, 264 So. 2d 817 (Miss. 1972) ; Wright v. State, 236 So. 2d
408 (Miss. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 929 (1971) ; Davis v. State, 204 So. 2d
270 (Miss. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) ; Allred v. State, 187
So. 2d 28 (Miss. 1966).
118. Neuenfeldt v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 20, 138 N.W.2d 252 (1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1025 (1966); State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d
753 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1966) ; Brown v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131
N.W.2d 169 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1966).
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while Michigan's highest court took occasional issue with Mapp.'1 9
Other state supreme courts, such as New York," '° Ohio, i 2 ' and Virginia,122 expressed objections to two or three of the Supreme Court's
doctrines. Although there were a few exceptions, organizational contumacy in these states was a matter of brief cue-giving rather than
extended discussion.'

23

However, in four states - New Jersey, Nebraska, Utah, and
Washington - organizational contumacy was both lengthy and frequent. Here such behavior went beyond the occasional unguarded
comment or venting of frustration. These courts engaged in deliberate
and extended action contrary to orthodox organizational theory. It
is in this situation that the challenge to constitutional policy making
as a hierarchical prerogative (insofar as criminal justice decisions are
concerned) is most potent.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey was perhaps the best example.
Open hostility to Mapp and Miranda permeated four of its opinions.
Chief Justice Weintraub wrote the three lengthier ones and seemed to
be the leading spirit behind the court's combative mood. 124 However,
no remonstrance came from any of the other justices. New Jersey's
attacks against the United States Supreme Court decisions were well
developed. They seemed basically motivated by a strong identification
with the "law and order" pressures upon the judiciary. Consider the following passage from State v. Gerardo,'25 a 1969 search- and seizure case.
119. People v. Pennington, 383 Mich. 611, 178 N.W.2d 471 (1970); People v.
Blessing, 378 Mich. 51, 142 N.W.2d 709 (1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 914 (1967);
People ex rel. Winkle v. Bannan, 372 Mich. 292, 125 N.W.2d 875 (1964), appeal'
dismissed, 380 U.S. 967 (1965).
120. People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969);
W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969), rev'd
on other grounds, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); People v. Grossman, 20 N.Y.2d 346, 229,
N.E.2d 589, 283 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1967).
121. State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396.
U.S. 1007 (1970) ; State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
122. Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S..
945 (1968) ; Hammer v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 135, 148 S.E.2d 878 (1966).
123. The best examples of lengthy contumacious opinions in states other than.
those discussed in the following text are: Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190, 144 S.E.2d 103
(1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 538 (1966) ; Commonwealth v. Eperjesi, 423:
Pa. 455, 224 A.2d 216 (1966) ; State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim. 1969),
vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 596 (1970).
124. For further evidence of Weintraub's attitudes in his area, see his concurring
opinions in State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 69, 286 A.2d 55, 59 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972) ; and State v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 266, 188.
A.2d 389, 398 (1963) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
125. 53 N.J. 261, 250 A.2d 130 (1969). Although the court's rhetoric in Gerardo
featured such words as "attack," "hurts," and "victims," the case involved a gambling
conviction. A rather similar opinion for the court by Chief Justice Weintraub appearedin State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971).
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It is an unhappy fact that the capacity of the judicial process to
deal with the demands of law enforcement is doubted by a substantial body of responsible men. The reasons are several. One is
the lengthening line of decisions which suppress the truth or block
access to it. It is idle to suppose, as some do, that those decisions
have no impact upon law enforcement or at the worst only a minimal one. The realities abound the other way ....
It bears repeating that the first right of the individual is to be
protected from criminal attack. That is the reason for government. The responsibility to that end rests no less upon the judiciary
than upon its co-ordinate branches. If the judiciary exerts its undoubted power to create new constitutional doctrines, it must first
learn what authority the other departments must have. The need
must be found, not in abstract contemplation, but in the tumult
of the streets ....
.. . To set criminals free is to exact a price, not from some
pain-free societal entity, but from innocent individuals who will
be their next victims. There are other hurts as well, for the suppression of proof of guilt must weaken respect for the reach of
the law, thereby increasing the toll of victims 'and injuring as well
those offenders who might have been deterred from a career of
lawlessness. Some would add their belief that current doctrines
tend to corrupt officials who, struggling to cope with the dirty
realities of crime, strain to bring the facts within unrealistic concepts. These trespasses upon the first right of the individual to
be protected from attack should not be suffered unless it is plain
that some larger individual value is served.' 2 6
The New Jersey court also developed its own counterlogic. In
State v. McKnight,127 Chief Justice Weintraub met Miranda head on:
When the guilty go undetected, or, if detected, are nonetheless set
free because plain evidence of guilt is suppressed, the price is
exacted from what must be the first right of the individual, the right
to be protected from criminal attack in his home, in his work, and in
the streets. Government is constituted to provide law and order.
The Bill of Rights must be understood in light of that mission.
There is no right to escape detection. There is no right to
commit a perfect crime or to an equal opportunity to that end.
The Constitution is not all offended when a guilty man stubs his
toe. On the contrary, it is decent to hope that he will. Nor is it
dirty business to use evidence a defendant himself may furnish
in the detectional stage ....
Hence while we are solicitous of the right to counsel at the
trial stage to the end that a defendant shall not suffer injustice
126. Id. at 263-64, 250 A.2d at 131.
127. 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968).
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because he is not equipped to protect himself, it would be thought128
less to transfer the same right to counsel to the detectional scene.
Presumably, in the face of such straightforward analyses, New
Jersey's trial judges would be hesitant to interpret or apply Mapp or
Miranda in any but a most narrow fashion.
Nebraska's highest court cast bitter aspersions upon both the
interrogation decisions and upon Gault. Two justices, Carter and
White, constituted the moving force behind that court's outspokenness.
Like the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the Nebraska Supreme Court
identified with law-and-order values. In its view, Escobedo and
Miranda endangered effective detective work, while Gault threatened
proper juvenile rehabilitation; above all, the court reminded, "the
victim of crime has some constitutional rights" too.1"
To a greater degree than its counterpart in New Jersey, however,
the Nebraska court at times seemed to distort the Supreme Court
opinions. The court stated that Miranda could be interpreted as an
invitation to rapists to "roam the streets at will,"'3 0 while Gault was
sure to bring about the "eventual destruction" of the juvenile court
3x
system.'
In an opinion which deplored the Gault decision, three members
of the Nebraska court launched a general attack upon the competence
and authority of the Supreme Court. "The fact that a judge is a member of the highest court of the nation ... is not ... proof of infallibility
of decision."' 3 2 Supreme Court justices were merely "better than average lawyers . . . who knew a President . . . .-18
Consequently, the
3
4
Court should show some "humility"'
when tempted to reject the
reasoning and experience behind doctrines solidly accepted by state
supreme courts. While acknowledging its obligation to abide by specific
holdings of the Supreme Court, they asserted that Nebraska would
"neither bend the knee nor bow the head" to the Court's doctrinal
35
trends.1
128. Id. at 52-53, 243 A.2d at 250.
129. State v. Caha, 184 Neb. 70, 76, 165 N.W.2d 362, 365 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 939 (1970). See also State v. Ross, 186 Neb. 280, 183 N.W.2d 229 (1971).
130. State v. Caha, 184 Neb. 70, 76, 165 N.W.2d 362, 365 (1969), cert. denied, 397

U.S. 939 (1970).
131. DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 481, 161 N.W.2d 508, 518 (1968)
(White, C.J., Carter & Newton, JJ., concurring), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 482, 161 N.W.2d at 519. Chief Justice Vhite and Justices Carter and
Newton expressed similar opinions in State v. Johns, 185 Neb. 590, 603, 177 N.W.2d
580, 588 (1970) (White, C.J., Carter & Newton, JJ., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court of Utah was also outspokenly hostile to the
High Court decisions in Mapp and Miranda. Here, too, an identification with law enforcement interests seemed prevalent. Unlike New
Jersey and Nebraska, however, its hostility was not manifested by the
acts of merely one or two justices; with one exception, 1 36 Utah's entire
court seemed actively engaged in organizational contumacy. Although
the lengthiest and most bitter condemnations were found in concurring
or dissenting opinions,' only the ferocity, and not the nature of the
behavior, was moderated in the opinions of the court's majority.
The majority of Utah's justices did not merely doubt the wisdom
of the Supreme Court's. policies; they questioned the Court's power
to formulate such policies as well. In Dyett v. Turner,,8 the Utah
court charged the Supreme Court with usurping authority by violating
the judiciary's procedural rules and traditions, to wit, the Constitution and earlier precedents. Worse, the Supreme Court was viewed as
having done this at the behest of' social reformers and a "small group
who refuse to take an oath that they will not overthrow this government by force."' 9 The court stated that it:
longed for the return to the days when the Constitution was a
document plain enough to be understood by all who read it, the
meaning of which was set firmly like a jewel in the matrix of
common sense and wise judicial decisions. 40
It was obvious to the Utah court that when judicial superiors fell prey
to neosubversives, and began to destroy the judicial organization's
ancient structure and promulgate substantive policies offensive to 90
percent of the population, they were hardly deserving of obedience
based upon hierarchical respect. The "superior power" of the Supreme
Court was grudgingly conceded, but, in the Utah court's own metaphor, it was the superior power of a ship's captain over 'his galley
slaves, the power of chains and lash over those who would bolt for
4
freedom at the first opportunity.1 '

136. State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64 (1967).
137. For an emotional and defiant challenge to Mapp, see Justice Henroid's concurring opinion in State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 69, 387 P.2d 240, 244 (1963)
(Henroid, J., concurring), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 1 (1964), which ends
with the ringing assertion that Utah can get along "without any Mapp to guide us."
Id. at 245. See also Justice Ellett's dissents in State v. Largo, 24 Utah 2d 430, 473
P.2d 895 (1970) (Ellett, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Jasso, 21 Utah
:2d 24, 439 P.2d 844 (1968) (Ellett, J., dissenting).
138. 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266 (1968). See note 105 and accompanying text
:supra. For a reiteration of the theme developed in Dyett, see State v. Rogers, 21
kUtah 2d 234, 444 P.2d 54 (1968) (Crockett, C.J., & Ellett, J., concurring).
139. 20 Utah 2d 403, 406, 439 P.2d 266, 268 (1968).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Waslhington's high court was also prone to criticize both Miranda
and Mapp.142 Unlike the courts above, however, some of its opinions
also contained positive evaluations of Miranda. Washington was the
only state supreme court to engage in a running internal debate upon
the merits of this controversial Supreme Court opinion. Justices Hale
(negative) and McGovern (positive) were the chief debaters, and
whether they spoke for the majority or dissent depended upon the shifting votes of the more silent "swing men" of this nine-member court.
State v. Valpredo48 best illustrates the opposing positions. Justice
McGovern spoke for the court with enthusiasm for Miranda's logic:
The hope of Mirandawas to eliminate those confessions which
are the product of an emotionally impaired state of mind ....
It was conceived by the court that a legally uneducated and unrepresented accused is no match for the skilled examining officer
in the compelling atmosphere of the police interrogation room ....
[I]nnumerable confessions have been uttered under those circumstances, not because the accused wanted to confess but because
he was then incapable of resisting the overpowering force of
government....
[Miranda] gives.., to the accused the armament with which
to resist that psychologically impelling power of authority ... .
Justice Hale's concurring opinion, however, challenged the Supreme
Court's (and McGovern's) reasoning:
[Miranda is] the product of little aptitude and less genuine information. The psychologically impelling power of authority mentioned by the majority as the rationale supporting Miranda, it
seems to me, is largely a figment of the judiciary's imagination and one completely repudiated every day in nearly every jailhouse and police station by .

. hardened criminals who . . .

steadfastly "refuse to give the police the time of day."
...

[As a result of Miranda] we have entered upon a won-

derful world of judicial nonsense and one bearing little connection with reality .... 145

142. While there was no extended criticism of Gault, the Washington court did
term that decision "substantially more far-reaching and revolutionary than . * '
[Miranda]." Brumley v. Charles R. Denney Juvenile Center, 77 Wash. 2d 702, 706,
466 P.2d 481, 483 (1970).
143. 75 Wash. 2d 368, 450 P.2d 979 (1969).
144. Id. at 370, 450 P.2d at 981.
145. Id. at 375-76, 450 P.2d at 984 (Hale, J., concurring). For other cases in the
McGovern-Hale "debate," see State v. Creach, 77 Wash. 2d 194, 461 P.2d 329 (1969) ;
City of Seattle v. Gerry, 76 Wash. 2d 689, 458 P.2d 548 (1969) ; Hendrix v. City of
Seattle, 76 Wash. 2d 142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970);
State v.. Tetzlaff, 75 Wash. 2d 649, 453 P.2d 638 (1969).
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A similar debate centered about the Mapp decision. Unlike the
Miranda debate, however, most of the evaluative pronouncements
came in concurring or dissenting opinions, with Justice Finley criticizing and Justice Rosellini defending the exclusionary rule.' 46
In this and the preceding sections, state supreme courts have been
treated as singular entities. However, as the analysis of these four
courts clearly indicates, organizational contumacy is, at least in part,
a function of the propensities of particular state supreme court justices.
While norms may vary somewhat, in few state supreme courts is an
opinion as much a collegial product as it is in the United States
Supreme Court. 4 " Moreover, few state supreme court justices share
the federal justices' propensity to engage in concurring opinions disassociating themselves from the reasoning of the opinion of the court. 4 '
Most commonly, court opinions are written by individual justices (sometimes in rotation assignment) and other justices in the majority silently
subscribe to what the opinion writer says. The New Jersey, Nebraska,
and Washington supreme courts might not have engaged in serious
organizational contumacy if Justices Weintraub, Carter, White, Hale,
and Finley had not been members of these courts. In other words,
this phenomenon is to some extent a result of the random distribution
of judicial personalities and organizational loyalties over state supreme
courts rather than a conscious effort of a particular court as a whole.
Nonetheless, it is still appropriate to focus upon the courts as singular
entities. The cues communicated to their subordinates in the judicial
hierarchy (trial judges, lawyers, etc.) carry the imprimatur of the court,
and presumably have the same impact regardless of their ultimate origin.
V.
The occurrence of organizational contumacy in the judiciary's
formulation and implementation of constitutional policy comes as no
great surprise. Presumably it is present at least to a minimal degree
in most political organizations; moreover, there is salient historical
precedent for it in the American judiciary. Nonetheless, discussions
of this phenomenon are few and attempts to ascertain its dimensions
are almost nonexistent. While the judicial impact studies have illumi146. The best exposition of this debate appeared in State v. Baker, 78 Wash. 2d
327, 474 P.2d 254 (1970). See also McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 398 P.2d 732
(1965) ; City of Tacoma v. Horton, 62 Wash. 2d 211, 382 P.2d 245 (1963) ; State v.
Maxie, 61 Wash. 2d 126, 377 P.2d 435 (1962) ; State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638,
374 P.2d 989 (1962).
147. See Sickels, The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the
Maryland Court of Appeals, 59 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 100 (1965).
148. See Canon & Jaros, State Supreme Courts - Some Comparative Data, 42
STATE Gov'T 260, 264 (1969).
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nated the area somewhat, their analyses tend to be haphazard and illustrative rather than systematic. 49 Moreover, as noted earlier, many
impact studies seem to leap over the judicial hierarchy to concentrate
upon the ultimate or penultimate recipients of policy, such as school
teachers or policemen. Obviously this attention is necessary, but such
findings might be placed in a clearer perspective if we also explore the
organizational links between the United States Supreme Court and
those charged with the final administration of its decisions.
In this article, an attempt has been made to fill a portion of this
void. It is by no means a complete effort. Exploration of the relationship between organizational contumacy and the actual nature of
state supreme court decisions relating to Mapp, Escobedo-Miranda,
and Gault has not been performed. 5 ' Nor has direct investigation
been made of the relationship between this phenomenon and the behavior of persons "in the field" who are ultimately charged with implementing Supreme Court decisions. Hence, conclusions about the
importance and impact of organizational contumacy must be viewed
as rather tentative.
As organizational theorists have recounted, subordinates are
subject to constant and numerous pressures undermining their loyalty to
the organization. To some extent these pressures are mitigated by
the status and isolation inherent in membership in the judicial organization. But the strength of these defenses varies according to the
subordinates' ambitions (particularly those of an extrajudicial nature),
previous experiences, and personalities. In at least four states, the
counterpressures of public opinion and judicial identification with outside groups or claims have blunted organizational loyalty to the point
of producing sustained organizational contumacy. Here, Supreme
Court opinions have undergone serious distortion in the vertical communication process as the state courts have painted exaggerated or
emotional pictures of a decision's adverse impact, have deprecated the
explanation behind the decision, or have gone so far as to argue that
the decision is procedurally illegitimate. Trial judges and lawyers in
these states are quite likely to be aware of the attitudes of their immediate hierarchical superiors toward Mapp, Escobedo-Miranda, and
Gault. Naturally such lowei echelon personnel must be able to anticipate the reactions of their immediate superiors. Indeed, in this situa149. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 10; Patric, supra note 2.
150. It is at least theoretically possible that some state supreme courts could engage
in organizational contumacy while liberally construing and applying decisions such as
Mapp and Miranda. It is more likely that some courts might narrowly construe such
decisions, perhaps to the point of virtual emasculation, without ever taking verbal issue
with them.
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tion, their immediate superiors are usually their sole concern: it is a
rare case that transcends the state supreme court to the United States
Supreme Court for decision. Consequently, it seems reasonable to
hypothesize that trial judges and, to a lesser extent, lawyers handling
cases centering about the above precedents may behave more cautiously
in New Jersey, Nebraska, Utah, and Washington than will their counterparts in other jurisdictions. In the long run, moreover, it is possible
for the contumacious influence of the above-named state supreme courts
to extend beyond their jurisdictions. Defiance is often contagious,
especially if no sanctions are applied to it; under the right conditions,
today's few rebels could be the forerunners of tomorrow's respectable
dissenters.
But there is another side of the issue that must also be considered.
It is clear that organizational contumacy is not a widespread phenomenon in the American judicial hierarchy as it interprets and
implements the Constitution. We have observed the judiciary's intermediate echelons as they labored under the considerable stress of the
sudden imposition of radically altered and seemingly unpopular policies.
Yet in only 5 percent of the cases implementing these policies did
organizational contumacy occur. In many of these instances, moreover, the "contumacious" behavior had an ephemeral or resigned air
about it. It seems reasonable to extrapolate from this finding and
hypothesize that organizational contumacy occurs even less frequently
in response to the great majority of less controversial Supreme Court
decisions.
In other words, despite the dearth of sanctions available for the
United States Supreme Court's exercise over state supreme courts, the
latter generally continue to function - verbally at least - in orthodox
organizational fashion. The strong bonds of organizational loyalty'
induced by the prestige and isolation of the judiciary seem triumphant
over those pressures which can produce organizational contumacy.
In addition, not all organizational contumacy is necessarily dysfunctional to the judiciary as a viable constitutional policy-making organization. It can be argued that some types of negative evaluations of presumably unpopular Supreme Court decisions can shield state supreme
courts from an intense and alienated public hoping to vent its frustrations upon a convenient target. State supreme courts are often more
vulnerable to popular retaliation than is the nation's highest court. 15 1
Such retaliation may be deflected or mitigated by timely symbolic
151. In Wisconsin, for instance, state supreme court justices who decided obscenity
cases in accordance with the Supreme Court's criteria found themselves in serious
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action - an official indication of sympathy with popular criticism.
Indeed, beyond protecting lower judicial echelons from external attack,
contumacious behavior can serve as an internal safety valve as well.
By verbally releasing their frustrations with the Supreme Court's
policies, state justices may avoid building psychological tensions which
could ultimately lead to more serious manifestations of defiance.
However, the line between functional and dysfunctional organizational contumacy is a thin and wavering one. What may initially
appear to be a relief of pressures, external or internal, may later prove
to be a catalyst of more serious problems. A few muttered asides of
backtalk may be the germs of contagious defiance. While this does
not seem to have happened with the criminal justice policies upon
which we have focused, the setting for such an epidemic can easily be
imagined. Had Hubert Humphrey won the 1968 election and Justice
Fortas not been forced from the bench, the spirit of the Warren Court's
criminal justice policies might have dominated the Supreme Court
up to the present time. In such a situation, functional organizational
contumacy might have proved the catalyst of widespread rebellion.
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